







Drawing upon Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory, the paper argues that the legal
claims of homeless appellants before and during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate our
universal vulnerability which stems from the essential, life-sustaining activities flowing
from the ontological status of the human body. By recognizing that housing availability
has constitutional significance because it provides for life-sustaining activities such as
sleeping, eating and lying down, I argue that the legal rationale reviewed in the paper
underscores the empirical, ontological reality of the body as the basis for a jurisprudence
of universal vulnerability. By tracing the constitutional basis of this jurisprudence from
Right to Travel to Eighth Amendment grounds during COVID-19, the paper outlines a
distinct legal paradigm for understanding vulnerability in its universal, constant and
essential form – one of the central premises of vulnerability theory.
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In the wake of the federal government’s Coronavirus Economic Stabilization Act of
2020,1 states and cities across the USA have employed Fair Housing emergency assis-
tance programs, eviction moratoriums and temporary shelter initiatives to address hous-
ing insecurity due to the economic fallout of the pandemic. In recent eviction cases in the
wake of COVID-19, courts have upheld federal eviction moratoriums based on the
statement by the Center for Disease Control that “ . . . a national homelessness crisis
could worsen the country’s coronavirus outbreak.”2 Yet this raises questions about
longer-term solutions to the housing availability crisis across the nation in general, the
inequities in health caused by lack of housing in urban “death zones,” and to what extent
individual states and city governments will actively pursue deeper reforms in housing
policy that aim to prevent future public health crises from occurring. After all, as one
District Court said in 1992, “(A)n individual who loses his home as a result of economic
hard times or physical or mental illness exercises no more control over these events than
he would over a natural disaster.”3 The recognition of vulnerability to housing insecurity,
particularly in the wake of COVID-19, continues to have important, but limited consti-
tutional significance. For some, the temporary measures pursued by many city and state
governments addressing housing insecurity in the wake of COVID-19 provides ample
opportunity for governments to implement longer-term solutions to housing.4 At the
same time, there are very limited constitutional resources to support such initiatives,
both at the federal and state level. This is so primarily because the U.S. federal consti-
tution does not expressly include affirmative protections or guarantees for housing.
Furthermore, the pandemic has brought to light a certain paradox for populations who
reside in states or municipalities which lack a sufficient supply of adequate and afford-
able housing. In the midst of a pandemic, the question has been raised: how can one
quarantine if one does not have a home (owned or rented)? Likewise, we could ask a
more fundamental question: how can one exercise basic, life-sustaining activities of
liberty, autonomy and privacy if one does not have a home? Federal District Courts
have ruled that laws and ordinances which arrest or punish homeless individuals for
performing life-sustaining acts in public where they have nowhere else to go are a
violation of the Eighth Amendment,5 and in some cases are a violation of the funda-
mental right to travel under equal protection.6 In recent cases involving the COVID-19
pandemic, however, U.S. courts have gone further and been more willing to explicitly
address not merely violation of fundamental rights and liberties of the homeless, but
have also addressed the affirmative legal obligations that exist to provide housing and
medical care for the homeless. Recently, California statutes on welfare mandating the
provision of state support to the indigent have been interpreted to argue that housing for
homeless populations is required to ensure the safety and health of homeless individuals
at imminent risk of hazardous waste.7 In this way, the issue of housing availability,
particularly in the wake of COVID-19, demonstrates that life-sustaining conduct con-
nected to housing needs is essential to the health and well-being of each and every
individual in a political community.
In legal cases involving homeless appellants before and during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, a jurisprudence of housing availability has emerged which emphasizes what
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Martha Fineman refers to as the features of the ontological body – the empirical, life-
sustaining realities of the body which serve as the basis for universal human vulner-
ability. In the first section of the paper, I contextualize the jurisprudence of housing
availability within Fineman’s vulnerability theory. After highlighting the features of the
ontological body as theorized by Fineman, I then review the constitutional grounds that
have been given which prohibit the criminalization of life-sustaining activity in the
context of insufficient housing availability. By recognizing that the objective, universal
features of the human body that necessitate life-sustaining activities such as sleeping,
eating and lying down have constitutional significance, I argue that this line of cases
underscores the empirical, ontological reality of the body as the basis for a universal
legal conception of vulnerability. As a result, it is argued that this jurisprudence of
universal subjectivity provides an alternative legal grounding for the possibility of a
constitutional right to housing, grounded in the basic human needs which stem from our
shared, universal vulnerability theorized by Professor Martha Fineman.
Vulnerability theory
Martha Fineman’s work on the “universal, vulnerable” legal subject is particularly
relevant to the discussion of housing availability. For Fineman, the equality/nondiscri-
mination paradigm which governs virtually all public policy on housing and homeless-
ness is “ . . . the lens through which contemporary legal culture tends to assess the nature
and effect of existing laws and determines the necessary direction of reform. As such,
this paradigm provides the governing logic for both criticism and justification of the
status quo. It is rooted in an understanding of the significance of the human being and a
belief in their fundamental parity under law that also asserts the inherent value of
individual liberty and autonomy, and thus is skeptical of state intervention into the
‘private’ sphere of life” (Fineman, 2020, p. 51). In relationships such as parent-child
or landlord-tenant relationships which are considered primarily “private” and over which
state regulation is limited, the remedy of inequalities arising within those spheres is
limited by the “ . . . jurisprudential logic that flows from an equality/antidiscrimination
paradigm” (Fineman, 2020, p. 52). This dominant paradigm, for Fineman, is grounded
upon an Enlightenment conception of legal subjectivity that can be characterized as
follows:
Our contemporary legal subject is posited as an autonomous and independent being whose
primary demand is for liberty or freedom from state interference. He claims a right to
autonomy to govern his own life while at the same time asserting his freedom from respond-
ing to the needs of others, who should be equally independent and self-sufficient . . . This
liberal legal subject is a fully functioning adult in charge and capable of making choices.
Unrestrained by the state, he will be rewarded according to his particular talents and
individual efforts. His social relations are defined by concepts, such as consent, and sup-
ported by legal doctrines, such as contract and property. (Fineman, 2020, pp. 53–54)
As Fineman notes, inequalities arising from more universal features of human vulner-
ability and dependency (such as dependence on basic, affordable shelter for exercising
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human needs), are consequently “ . . . .strictly considered to be an individual, not a
societal, problem. Thus, such problems are deemed a personal, rather than public,
responsibility” (Fineman, 2020, p. 54). As an alternative to this paradigm, Fineman’s
vulnerability theory proposes “ . . . a legal subject that is primarily defined by vulner-
ability and need, rather than exclusively by rationality and liberty, more fully reflects the
human condition” (Fineman, 2020, p. 54). As such, institutions should be built to
respond to human vulnerability and dependence, focused on the universal aspects of
human vulnerability as the primary considerations for a responsive state. Vulnerability
theory, for Fineman, recognizes that spheres traditionally relegated to the “private”
sphere, including the family relations and market relationships, are more often than not
in fact issues of public, universal concern that involve relations of dependence and
vulnerability which give rise to forms of inequality which the state and governments
remain limited to address. As Fineman notes,
that these constructed entities are deemed “private” institutions – even though we enact laws
to facilitate their creation; determine their shape, terms, and responsibilities; and ease their
functioning – is a paradox. They are creatures of law, brought into being by doctrines set out
in corporate, family, property, corporate, employment, tax, trade, welfare, and other laws.
The law determines the nature of the relationships between individuals within these essen-
tial social institutions, such as parent-child, employer-employee, shareholder-consumer,
and so on. (Fineman, 2020, pp. 59–60)
With these recognitions, vulnerability theory “ . . . expands our notion of what con-
stitutes an injury of constitutional significance to include the gross neglect or willful
disregard of circumstances of profound deprivation and unmet need on the part of some
citizens . . . [and] state responsibility as arising from the human needs organically rooted
in universal vulnerability and dependency” (Fineman, 2020, p. 61). In this way, legal
remedies for discrimination, unfair or unjust treatment are limited by the equality/non-
discrimination paradigm which views goods like housing and health care as market
goods pursued voluntarily through private relationships by rational individuals free from
government discrimination. The dominant legal subject is independent, not dependent,
capable and rational, not vulnerable. As a result, there are few resources to draw upon to
provide remedies in cases of discrimination, violence, unfair or unjust treatment even
when such treatment seems to violate basic, universal exercises of conduct essential to
what it means to be human.
In addition, vulnerability theory emphasizes that the central characteristic of the
human condition is our shared, universal vulnerability grounded in the empirical realities
of the body. Rather than presupposing a rational, invulnerable body as the starting point
for a legal conception of subjectivity, vulnerability theory begins with the premise that
the human body is ontologically vulnerable – the very substance of the body necessitates
its vulnerability to its environment. Because of this central thesis, vulnerability theory
recognizes that the needs provided by housing are not special features of homeless
populations, but rather basic, universal features of what it means to be human. In this
way, homeless populations suffer a specific susceptibility to the COVID-19 pandemic
and infectious disease more broadly, but the needs which housing provides – access to
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safe, adequate shelter for sleeping, eating, lying down, etc – are in fact universal, basic
and essential to being human.
At the same time, vulnerability theory acknowledges that homeless populations have
a specific susceptibility to COVID-19, and to the lack of housing availability more
broadly. Indeed, research from across many major urban cities in the United States have
highlighted the stark inequity in mortality indexes for those who lack access to safe,
affordable housing.8 The mortality indexes found in these zones have been compared to
areas declared as natural disaster zones, and in some cases have been found to have
higher death rates than those in natural disaster areas (O’Connell, 2005, p. 2). The
confluence of poor housing, disability, and social isolation in these areas have led some
to describe these areas as “death zones” which pose significant health risks to those who
lack access to safe, affordable shelter. Homeless populations in general have been found
to have much lower life expectancy (Lima et al., 2020, p. 112945) are more likely to have
chronic pre-existing health conditions which increase susceptibility to disease (Kaysin
et al., 2020, pp. 1362–1364) and lack of housing itself has been identified as a major risk
factor in repeat emergency room visits, with homeless individuals being 9 times more
likely to return to emergency rooms within 30 days and 11 times more likely to return to
emergency room departments over the course of 2 years (Amato et al., 2019, pp. 415–420).
These and other factors point to the specific susceptibility of homeless populations to
infectious diseases such as COVID-19, as well as to governmental responses to inequitable
outcomes of the crisis upon communities of color (Novasky and Rosales, 2020, p. 130).
Such public health crises affect street populations who lack adequate access to medical
care as well as shelter populations in often over-crowded, congregate settings which are
particularly susceptible to disease transmission. From the perspective of vulnerability
theory, the basic needs at issue when speaking of housing the homeless are not special
to homeless populations, but rather are universal needs that stem from the fact of being
human. Specifically, vulnerability theory recognizes that it is precisely the essential fea-
tures of the human body which make the need for exercising life-sustaining conduct
universal, and constant.
According to Fineman, contemporary conceptions of vulnerability define what it
means to be vulnerable either by “ . . . the episodic potential impairment of individual
bodies” (Fineman, 2021, p. 4), or by “ . . . certain demographic differences in bodies,
associating them with distinct social, economic, or political disadvantages” (Fineman,
2021, p. 4). The second conception, one Fineman refers to as “special vulnerability,”
“ . . . is common in professional discourses, such as law and public health, where there are
frequent references to specific ‘vulnerable populations’. Sometimes these populations
are perceived as lacking in ability, capacity, or character. Quite often they are stigma-
tized as a result” (Fineman, 2021, p. 4). This conception, Fineman explains, results in the
designation of “vulnerable populations” which provide “ . . . the basis for arguing they
deserve special legal and political consideration, some reparations for the diminished
social, political, economic, or legal position they innocently occupy” (Fineman, 2021, p.
5). In contrast, vulnerability theory argues that “ . . . individuals and groups described as
‘vulnerable populations’ should not be labelled vulnerable, nor should they be seques-
tered in discreet categories for the purpose of law and policy” (Fineman, 2021, p. 5).
Rather, Fineman argues that vulnerability is itself a universal and constant feature of the
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human condition, grounded in the body as a pre-political and pre-moral theoretical
concept. As Fineman writes,
the body in vulnerability theory is an ontological or anthropological concept, a fundamental
reality, consistent over time, place, and space. Vulnerability is intrinsic to the body, actually
indistinguishable from the body and, therefore, an element of the ontological. (Fineman,
2021, p. 6)
Importantly, for Fineman, the ontological status of the body is what grounds the
argument that “ . . . human vulnerability provides the primary legitimating justification
for the coercive ordering of human relationships and endeavors through law” (Fineman,
2021, p. 6). As I argue in the following section, it is the ontological status of the human
body and the life-sustaining activities which spring from that status upon which a
jurisprudence of universal subjectivity may be constructed.
The jurisprudence of universal subjectivity
Given the ontological reality of the human body and the life-sustaining activities which
flow from our very being, the basic needs which housing provides gain constitutional
significance from the perspective of vulnerability theory. In this section, I review the
constitutional grounds that have been given which have led to the recognition of the
constitutional significance of housing availability in American jurisprudence. With
respect to the question of human vulnerability to the availability of housing, American
constitutional jurisprudence contains somewhat of a paradox. On the one hand, the U.S.
Supreme Court has infamously ruled that the federal Constitution does not guarantee a
right to housing, and that state legislatures are the proper venue to address social and
economic policy under the purview of the reserved powers of the individual states.9 In
general, federal and state constitutional rights to health and housing follow an individual,
negative rights approach, viewing health care and housing as market goods pursued by
individuals free from government discrimination (Leonard, 2010, p. 1392). As Fineman
notes,
The denial of positive rights means that the state has no constitutional responsibility to
guarantee access to basic goods and services. As a result, the Constitution, as it is inter-
preted, thus tolerates (and even condones) state disregard for or abandonment and neglect of
basic human needs. (Fineman, 2018, p. 52)
While state constitutions have often gone beyond the negative federal constitutional
approach in affirming the provision of affordable housing as part of statutory laws
requiring medical care to the indigent, it remains the case that affordable shelter, much
like the right to health care, is not recognized as an affirmative, enforceable right in
either U.S. federal or state constitutions (Leonard, 2010, p. 1392). On the other hand,
federal courts have consistently maintained that while life-sustaining activities exercised
in public spaces is unavoidable for homeless populations without reasonable
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alternatives, such social and economic “problems” are issues for state legislatures and
not the judiciary. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit explained their position:
There is obviously a “homeless problem” in the City of Los Angeles, which the City is free
to address in any way that it sees fit, consistent with the constitutional principles we have
articulated. See id. By our decision, we in no way dictate to the City that it must provide
sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the
streets of Los Angeles at any time and at any place within the City. All we hold is that, so
long as there is a greater number of homeless individuals in Los Angeles than the number of
available beds, the City may not enforce section 41.18(d) at all times and places throughout
the City against homeless individuals for involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in
public.10
More recently, in Blake v. City of Grants Pass, three homeless citizens of an Oregon
city with an undersupply of affordable housing units sought relief from local “anti-
homeless” ordinances that restricted or prevented life-sustaining activities in public
spaces. The Court ruled that, especially in light of the COVID pandemic, city laws
which criminalize life-sustaining activities violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual and Excessive Fines clause.11 The District Court in Blake, however, followed
the line of reasoning in Jones when ruling against the city’s anti-homeless ordinances
that violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, remarking that “ . . . this holding in no
way dictates to a local government that it must provide sufficient shelter for the home-
less.”12 The paradox of American jurisprudence on the question of housing, therefore,
can be seen in the fact that housing availability has constitutional significance while
housing itself is not recognized as an affirmative constitutional right.
When we turn to the question of the criminalization of homelessness – laws which
criminalize life-sustaining activities necessary for daily survival without access to shel-
ter – American jurisprudence has turned largely on the question of whether homeless
individuals should be viewed as rational, voluntary agents violating city ordinances, or
vulnerable populations dependent on exercising life-sustaining conduct in public places
due to lack of housing availability. However, the legal claims of particular homeless
appellants before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, I argue, illustrate the general,
universal claims that stem from the essential, life-sustaining activities inherent to the
ontological status of the vulnerable human body. By recognizing that the objective,
universal features of the human body that necessitate life-sustaining activities such as
sleeping, eating and lying down have constitutional significance, this line of cases
underscroes the empirical, ontological reality of the body as the basis for a universal
legal conception of vulnerability. This rationale, I argue, is the basis for a jurisprudence
of universal subjectivity, grounded in the basic features of the universal vulnerable legal
subject. The legal recognition that these claims have universal and not merely particular
or special constitutional import demonstrates, at least to some degree, the acknowledg-
ment of a distinct legal paradigm for understanding vulnerability in its universal, con-
stant and essential form – one of the central premises of vulnerability theory. In what
follows, I outline the constitutional bases of this rationale, and demonstrate how the
recognition of the body’s essential life-sustaining activities has led to the legal assertion
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of the constitutional significance of the availability of housing. I do so by reviewing the
constitutional arguments that have been given in American jurisprudence upholding the
necessity of life-sustaining activities based on Right to Travel, Equal Protection and
finally Eighth Amendment grounds.
Right to travel
U.S. Federal District Courts have ruled that denying “necessities of life” involving life-
sustaining activities like sleeping, eating and lying down without a compelling interest
by least restrictive means is a violation of the fundamental right to travel, and is an
unconstitutional violation of fundamental rights.13 This reasoning is in part based on the
Supreme Court’s decision that any law or policy which effectively penalizes travel will
be unconstitutional if it denies a person a “necessity of life,” such as free medical care.14
In 1941, the Supreme Court clarified that
The conclusion that the right of free movement is a right of national citizenship stands on
firm historical ground. If a state tax on that movement . . . is invalid, a fortiori a state statute
which obstructs or in substance prevents that movement must fall. That result necessarily
follows unless perchance a State can curtail the right of free movement of those who are
poor or destitute. But to allow such an exception to be engrafted on the rights of national
citizenship would be to contravene every conception of national unity. It would also intro-
duce a caste system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of government. It
would permit those who were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to
be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It would prevent a citizen because he was
poor from seeking new horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from large segments
of our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom of opportunity. The
result would be a substantial dilution of the rights of national citizenship, a serious impair-
ment of the principles of equality. Since the state statute here challenged involves such
consequences, it runs afoul of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.15
This rationale has since been used by lower courts to invalidate anti-homeless ordi-
nances restricting life-sustaining conduct in public spaces. As one famous District Court
case concluded, “(I)f ‘necessities of life’ are denied, fundamental rights of travel are
violated. Anti-homeless ordinances violate the fundamental rights of travel and migra-
tion without a compelling government interest through the least restrictive means.”16 On
the basis of this fundamental rights analysis, the Court clarified that “ . . . laws that
prevent homeless individuals who have no place to go from sleeping, lying down, eating
and performing other harmless life-sustaining activities burdens their right to travel.”17
The District Court in this case clarified some of the activities of life-sustaining conduct
in question, writing that, “(I)ndeed, forcing homeless individuals from sheltered areas or
from public parks or streets affects a number of ‘necessities of life’ – for example, it
deprives them of a place to sleep, of minimal safety and of cover from the elements.”18
Finally, the Court significantly concluded that, while the homeless might in fact qualify
as a “suspect class” under equal protection claims, a higher standard of equal protection
analysis was not necessary, since fundamental rights were at issue:
8 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law XX(X)
This court is not entirely convinced that homelessness as a class has none of these
“traditional indicia of suspectness.” It can be argued that the homeless are saddled with
such disabilities, or have been subjected to a history of unequal treatment or are so polit-
ically powerless that extraordinary protection of the homeless as a class is warranted.
However, resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of the evidence presented at trial and,
in any event, is unnecessary for, as discussed below, we resolve the question of the appro-
priate standard to apply based on our determination that the City has infringed upon plain-
tiffs’ fundamental right to travel.19
In cases as recent as 2019, Federal District Courts have found anti-homeless laws and
ordinances violate the right to travel.20 The rationale in this case was based in part on the
equal protection ruling of Shapiro, which ruled as unconstitutional a Connecticut dura-
tional residency requirement for welfare benefits. In that case, a “ . . . first class is granted
and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to subsist – food, shelter, and other necessities of
life.”21 The standard of Equal Protection claims has shown to be exceptionally difficult
to meet for claims based on homelessness as a “suspect class.” While some have force-
fully argued for homelessness to be understood as the basis for a “suspect class” (Wat-
son, 2003, p. 501), Pottinger demonstrated a different approach. In that case, the Court
found that, because fundamental rights to the “necessities of life” were being curtailed,
the ordinances in question required strict scrutiny to determine a compelling interest by
the least restrictive means, and were found to be unconstitutional infringements on the
right to travel.
However, this way of analysis only applies to government action, and says nothing
about the lack of government action on housing provision. If there exists a state statute
requiring housing provision for the homeless as a requirement for providing medical
care, then it might be claimed that failure to do so violates state constitutional statutes.
However, in states where no such statute exists, it cannot be claimed that the “necessities
of life” are being actively curtailed by government simply because there is a lack of
sufficient housing infrastructure. An insufficient infrastructure of housing that is largely
inaccessible to the poor is, in itself, not currently recognized as repugnant to the U.S.
Constitution, which only appears to restrict active violations of fundamental rights by
state and city governments, and does not provide a basis to compel states to make
housing an affirmative, enforceable right.
Eighth Amendment
Various challenges to municipal anti-homeless ordinances across the U.S. by homeless
individuals have in recent years given rise to novel judicial interpretations of the con-
stitutional significance of the provision of housing. Building upon federal rulings since
the 1990s regarding the universal, unavoidable conduct of homeless individuals in the
context of insufficient housing, the Jones-Martin line of cases recognizes homelessness
as a constitutionally cognizable status due to the involuntary and unavoidable nature of
universal, life-sustaining conduct without recourse to adequate shelter, and recognizes
the due process implications for “vulnerable populations” of the homeless who lack the
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ability for adequate legal representation and defense. This “equal process” constitutional
analysis – examined in the final section of the paper (Garrett, 2019, p. 2) – lays the
groundwork for the argument that housing has constitutional significance, and that lack
of affordable, adequate shelter implicates due process and equal protection for vulner-
able populations.
This argument has been bolstered by recent cases involving housing and homeless-
ness during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the central issue is the cruel and/or unduly
harsh conditions created by governments which lack or deny sufficient accessibility to
affordable, adequate shelter to their citizens. In recent eviction cases in the wake of
COVID-19, courts have upheld federal eviction moratoriums,22 based on the CDC’s
recognition that “ . . . a national homelessness crisis could worsen the country’s corona-
virus outbreak.”23 The lack of affordable shelter therefore has taken on significance not
only for constitutional reasons in the Jones-Martin line of cases, but also for public
health and safety reasons in the wake of the growing pandemic. Both of these reasons are
reflected in Blake’s Pass and LA All. for Human Rights, lending to the conclusion that
housing availability has constitutional significance because of the nature of the life-
sustaining activities which it provides – activities which, as I argue, are essential to the
universal vulnerable legal subject.
In Jones v. City of Los Angeles (2010), the court underscored the lack of housing
availability and the involuntary nature of universal, life-sustaining conduct as the pri-
mary factors in determining the constitutionality of municipal ordinances criminalizing
the activity of homeless individuals. The court found that,
Because there is substantial and undisputed evidence that the number of homeless persons in
Los Angeles far exceeds the number of available shelter beds at all times, including on the
nights of their arrest or citation, Los Angeles has encroached upon Appellants’ Eighth
Amendment protections by criminalizing the unavoidable act of sitting, lying, or sleeping
at night while being involuntarily homeless. A closer analysis of Robinson and Powell
instructs that the involuntariness of the act or condition the City criminalizes is the critical
factor delineating a constitutionally cognizable status, and incidental conduct which is
integral to and an unavoidable result of that status, from acts or conditions that can be
criminalized consistent with the Eighth Amendment.24
In a particularly important section addressing the constitutionality of the ant-camping
ordinance, the court said that, “(W)hether sitting, lying, and sleeping are defined as acts
or conditions, they are universal and unavoidable consequences of being human. It is
undisputed that, for homeless individuals in Skid Row who have no access to private
spaces, these acts can only be done in public.”25 Further, the court ruled that, “ . . . by
criminalizing sitting, lying, and sleeping, the City is in fact criminalizing Appellants’
status as homeless individuals.”26 As a result, the holding affirmed that “ . . . .the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the City from punishing involuntary sitting, lying, or sleeping on
public sidewalks that is an unavoidable consequence of being human and homeless
without shelter in the City of Los Angeles.”27 In addition, the court pointed out the
practical limitations homeless individuals face in defending their constitutional rights,
pointing out that
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. . . the practical realities of homelessness make the necessity defense a false promise for
those charged with violating section 41.18(d). Homeless individuals, who may suffer from
mental illness, substance abuse problems, unemployment, and poverty, are unlikely to have
the knowledge or resources to assert a necessity defense to a section 41.18(d) charge, much
less to have access to counsel when they are arrested and arraigned. Furthermore, even
counseled homeless individuals are unlikely to subject themselves to further jail time and a
trial when they can plead guilty in return for a sentence of time served and immediate
release. Finally, one must question the policy of arresting, jailing, and prosecuting individ-
uals whom the City Attorney concedes cannot be convicted due to a necessity defense.
Because of the situation of homeless individuals in the city, the court suggested that
the policy of arresting and prosecuting those in violation of the anti-camping ordinance
amounted to “ . . . merely police harassment of a vulnerable population.”28
In Martin v. Boise City, the court followed the reasoning of Jones in finding that,
“ . . . an ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes criminal sanc-
tions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors, on public property, when no
alternative shelter is available to them.”29 Again, linking the availability of shelter to the
constitutionality of municipal anti-homeless ordinances, the court ruled that, “ . . . as long
as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent,
homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise they had
a choice in the matter.”30 As a result, the holding in Martin echoed that of Jones: “(W)e
conclude that a municipality cannot criminalize such behavior consistently with the
Eighth Amendment when no sleeping space is practically available in any shelter.”31
COVID-19 and universal vulnerability
Since the COVID-19 pandemic and the response of state governments to manage the
public health crisis, several cases involving homeless citizens’ claims of discriminatory
treatment have once again raised the issue of housing infrastructure as a necessary
condition for life-sustaining conduct. In a case involving three homeless appellants, the
Court was presented with, “ . . . three class representatives [who] all share the need to
conduct the life sustaining activities of resting, sleeping, and seeking shelter from the
elements while living in Grants Pass without a permanent home.”32 Recognizing the
plaintiffs’ specific susceptibility to the COVID-19 pandemic and the public health crisis,
the Court observed that
With the lack of access to the most basic of human needs, including running water, toilets,
and trash disposal, infectious diseases – like COVID-19 – can spread quickly. Uprooting
homeless individuals, without providing them with basic sanitation and waste disposal
needs, does nothing more than shift a public health crisis from one location to another,
potentially endangering the health of the public in both locations. This concern is particu-
larly acute during the current COVID-19 pandemic.33
In this way, the Court acknowledges the absurdity of punishing and even relocating
individuals for being homeless in a municipality where affordable housing is not widely
available or accessible. Because of this, the Court found that the local anti-homeless
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ordinances “ . . . unconstitutionally punished them for conducting life-sustaining activi-
ties and criminalized their existence as homeless individuals.”34 The Court continued,
clarifying that
. . . it is not enough under the Eight Amendment to simply allow sleeping in public spaces;
the Eight Amendment also prohibits a City from punishing homeless people for taking
necessary minimal measures to keep themselves warm and dry while sleeping when there
are no alternative forms of shelter available.35
However, in finding that the ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual clause and the Excessive Fines clause, it also said that such a ruling “ . . . .does
not automatically translate to a finding that Grants Pass officials acted with deliberate
indifference or reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.”36 In a similar case,
a District Court in California concluded that, “ . . . the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
City from punishing involuntary sitting, lying, or sleeping on public sidewalks that is an
unavoidable consequence of being human and homeless without shelter in the City of
Los Angeles.”37 In each of these cases, however, the Courts emphasized that the rulings
did not imply that the cities had an affirmative duty to provide shelter for the homeless.
From the perspective of vulnerability theory, the above cases illustrate that the state
recognizes the harm caused by criminalizing life-sustaining activity, but only when there
is a lack of sufficient housing availability. In other words, if the life-sustaining conduct
of individuals is considered involuntary due to lack of shelter alternatives, then the state
recognizes the potential for harm by criminalizing such conduct. However, these cases
also illustrate that the state does not recognize harm caused by a lack of adequate and
affordable housing in-itself. Indeed, as long as a city or municipality refrains from
criminalizing such conduct, there is no harm recognized by a lack of sufficient housing
availability by itself. Once again, this is consistent with the federal ruling of Lindsey v.
Normet that the U.S. constitution does not guarantee an affirmative right to housing.
However, some states have relied upon existing state statutes for providing welfare
and support for indigent citizens as a mechanism for pressuring city governments to act
on providing affordable shelter. In 2020, in LA All. For Human Rights v. City of Los
Angeles, the Court relied upon provisions of California state statutes on welfare to
conclude that there does in fact exist an affirmative duty to provide shelter to the home-
less. The Court relied upon California state statutes, which affirm that, “(E)very county
and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent
persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein,
when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their
own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions.”38 Specifically
focusing on the threat of COVID-19, the Court observed that that this novel virus
“ . . . poses an especial danger to the vulnerable homeless population. Without adequate
access to shelter, hygiene products, and sanitation facilities, individuals experiencing
homelessness face a greater risk of contracting the novel coronavirus, and an outbreak in
the homeless community would threaten the general public as well.”39 In the context of
the inaction of the City and County on the issue of housing amid the growing pandemic,
the Court observed that, “(T)he severe health hazards attendant on living near
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overpasses, underpasses, and ramps – to say nothing of the public health risks illumi-
nated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic – present just such an urgent crisis and better
inform the constitutional understanding of ordered liberty.”40 The Court concluded that
the City and County had failed to act pursuant to the state statutes requiring the provision
of medical care, stating that, “ . . . by failing to provide adequate shelter or alternative
housing options, the City and County of Los Angeles have essentially forced individuals
experiencing homelessness to camp in these dangerously polluted locations. It is clear to
the Court that the Due Process Clause does not allow this kind of governmental con-
duct.”41 Because the City and County had failed in the Court’s eyes to take action, the
Court then took upon itself to prescribe the action and timeframe for policy changes,
stating, “(A)s part of this humane relocation effort, and to promote the underlying public
health and safety goals, the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles shall provide
shelter – or alternative housing options, such as safe parking sites, or hotel and motel
rooms contracted under Project Roomkey – to individuals experiencing
homelessness.”42
While these judicial directives of the decision were later vacated on condition of an
agreement between the City and County to address the housing problem in Los Angles,
the reasoning the Court drew upon is highly significant. Most importantly, The Court
relied upon what it recognized as the binding precedent in Martin, which the Court said
“ . . . gave constitutional significance to the availability of shelter – which, in this context,
could plausibly implicate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”43 The Court’s recognition that housing availability may argu-
ably implicate both Due Process and Equal Protection is highly significant, because it
departs from the traditional, negative rights approach to housing as a market good
pursued by individuals. Rather, by recognizing the failure of state government to provide
housing infrastructure as a statutory requirement for providing more affordable housing,
the Court gave constitutional significance to the availability of housing itself. In this
way, LA All. For Human Rights v. City of Los Angeles represents what some legal
scholars and constitutional lawyers have called “equal process” analysis which seeks
to address class-discrimination as an instance of the “intersection” of equal protection
and due process. The basic rationale for considering wealth and economic disadvantage
stems from the recognition that “ . . . indigent people often suffer from both (1) arbitrary
decision-making and inadequate access to courts, as well as, (2) the unequal outcomes
that result” (Garrett, 2019, p. 405). In traditional, “negative rights” constitutional
analyses,
. . . wealth is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and
because procedural unfairness can more severely impact indigent people who do not have
the same access to attorneys and other aspects of the legal process. (Garrett, 2019, p. 407)
Instead, “equal process” analysis with regard to housing availability recognizes the
intersection of procedural and substantive due process with equal protection for those
classes arbitrarily lacking access to the physical, legal, and economic conditions for the
exercise of basic, life-sustaining activities essential to being human. This method of
constitutional analysis provides support for affirmative, enforceable constitutional rights
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to housing, especially in states and cities where “death zones” and areas of insufficient or
unaffordable housing effectively and arbitrarily prevent indigent populations from exer-
cising basic, fundamental rights of life, liberty and privacy.
This legal rationale – that housing has constitutional significance because it provides
for basic, life-sustaining activity – is extremely significant from the perspective of
vulnerability theory. In short, this rationale is an acknowledgment that the basic, uni-
versal features of human vulnerability theorized by Fineman have constitutional signif-
icance. In this way, the form of vulnerability which grounds the legal rationale is not
special or episodic, but rather the same form of vulnerability which we all share as
human beings with vulnerable bodies biologically compelled to eat, sleep, lay down,
etc. The legal claims of particular homeless appellants before and during the COVID-19
pandemic illustrate that life-sustaining activities including sleeping, lying down, eating,
bodily safety and other harmless life functions are so basic to the human condition that
they may not be criminalized under conditions of housing unavailability. The claims, I
argue, demonstrate the general, universal nature of the ontological body in Fineman’s
vulnerability theory. The legal recognition that these basic, life-sustaining activities have
universal and not merely particular or exceptional constitutional import demonstrates the
acknowledgment that vulnerability theory offers an alternative legal paradigm for under-
standing humanity in its universal, constant and essential form – one of the central
premises of vulnerability theory.
Conclusion
Research has shown that in states with constitutions which expressly affirm protections
for health and medical care, such states have better health outcomes, particularly for
minority populations. In fact, the state constitutional recognition of affirmative duties to
provide health care, “ . . . is associated with a reduction in the infant mortality rate of
7.8%.” This link between affirmative constitutional rights to health and medical care and
health outcomes is significant with respect to equal protection issues as well, since it is
shown that, “ . . . the introduction of a stronger constitutional commitment to health and
health care reduces the racial gap in infant mortality” (Matsuura, 2015, pp. e48–e54). By
the same token, states which lack affirmative commitments to housing infrastructure not
only run the risk of violating the fundamental constitutional rights of individuals, but
urban “death zones” which lack affordable shelter produce worse mortality indexes in
the population compared to those in some natural disaster areas. From the perspective of
individuals, one’s residence in a particular state or city – which is mostly arbitrary –
determines one’s constitutional protections for housing and medical care, and thus
determines health outcomes based on arbitrary measures. This lack of uniformity in
states’ constitutional protections for housing creates arbitrary and unequal outcomes for
individuals across states – outcomes which are largely based on race and class.
From the perspective of vulnerability theory, the temporary governmental responses
to housing insecurity and homelessness during COVID-19 are ill-equipped when faced
with the constant, universal needs which housing provides us all. Because there is neither
a federal constitutional recognition of the universality of housing needs, nor a federal
mandate to enforce state’s affirmative commitments social and economic rights,
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individual rights and liberties as well as basic human needs universal to the human
condition of vulnerability will continue to be systematically deprived. Since the para-
digmatic legal subject is independent, not dependent, city ordinances that criminalize
universal acts of sleeping, lying down and eating – even when there is not a sufficient
infrastructure of housing in place – are still often seen as rational, voluntary choices and
thus enforceable and punishable. Further, in situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic
where temporary emergency measures provide short-term stop-gaps for the ongoing
need for adequate shelter, there are few resources to draw upon to mandate and provide
long-term, structural remedies for treatment which seems to violate basic, life-sustaining
exercises of conduct essential to what it means to be human. From the perspective of
vulnerability theory, these shortcomings stem from the dominant legal paradigm under
which notions of harm, discrimination and rights are defined, viewing positive rights
such as housing as inimical to the protection of the individual liberty of rational actors
within the private spheres of economics, business, home and family life.
However, Fineman’s vulnerability theory, I argue, provides an alternative legal para-
digm for grounding the notion of housing as a basic constitutional right. Viewing the
cases reviewed in this paper from the perspective of vulnerability theory, we are able to
recognize the basic, shared sense of vulnerability which marks each of us as human
beings with bodies biologically compelled to eat, sleep, lay down, and perform other life-
sustaining functions. The particular claims of homeless appellants before and during the
COVID-19 pandemic can therefore be viewed as forms of the kind of universal claims
that stem from the essential, life-sustaining activities inherent to the ontological status of
the vulnerable human body. Most significantly, the legal rationale reviewed in this paper
acknowledges that the objective, universal features of the human body that necessitate
life-sustaining activities such as sleeping, eating and lying down have constitutional
significance. This rationale – based on the necessity of essential, life-sustaining activities
of the body – is the basis for a jurisprudence of universal subjectivity. This form of
jurisprudential reasoning, it is hoped, will contribute to a legal framework of vulner-
ability which speaks and gives legal recognition to our ontological status as universally
vulnerable beings.
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